Until 1967, Indigenous Australians were excluded from being counted as amongst 'the people' in the Australian Constitution, by s 127. That section was deleted by referendum. However, s 25 remains in the Constitution, and allows for the reintroduction of such exclusion. This article is a detailed reconsideration of both sections in light of an understanding of 'the people' as a reference to the constitutional community represented by the Parliament. Exclusion of Indigenous Australians prior to 1967 is considered, highlighting the way in which s 127 operated. Then, the position post-1967 is addressed to show that the deletion of s 127 did not result in equality because s 25 continues to provide for racial exclusion. This article argues that this ongoing possibility of exclusion by s 25 affects the nature of the Australian constitutional community, by indicating that it can be racially discriminatory.
INTRODUCTION
On 16 January 2012, the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians presented its report to the federal government. 1 The report contained proposals for constitutional amendment in order to recognise Indigenous Australians 2 in the Constitution. The proposals were introduced with references to nationhood and _____________________________________________________________________________________  Senior Lecturer, Sydney Law School. Thanks to Helen Irving, Ed Muston and the anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this work. The phrase 'Indigenous Australians' is used in this work to refer to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
In 1977, s 128 was amended by referendum to extend voting rights in referenda to electors in the territories 'in respect of which there is in force a law allowing its representation in the House of Representatives'. The Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory both receive such representation: see Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 48(2B). Therefore, electors in those two territories may vote in federal referenda. However, referenda voting rights have also been extended to all voters in all Australian territories. That is, territories beyond the NT and the ACT: see Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (Cth) s 4(1) which states that 'An elector is entitled to vote at a referendum where, if the referendum were an election, the elector would be entitled to vote at the election.' Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 93(8AA). 'Sentence of imprisonment' meant 'detention on a full-time basis': s 4(1A)(a). That section had replaced the earlier prisoner disenfranchisement regime, which applied to 'a person who … is serving a sentence of three years or longer for an offence against the law of ... a State': s 93(8). 22 The earlier legislative position, noted above, was revived.
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ people'. 23 The constitutional 'people' were the centrepiece of representative government and to disenfranchise all prisoners was beyond the justifiable limits on the federal franchise.
Rowe was a case which challenged the timing of the closing of the electoral rolls prior to the 2010 federal election. Parliament had passed legislation which reduced the amount of time within which eligible persons could enrol to vote following the calling of an election. 24 The Court struck down the legislation as being inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of choice by 'the people'. The detriment caused by the legislation outweighed any potential benefits of the early closing of the rolls. Once again, 'the people' would have been prevented from choosing their Parliament.
At the heart of these cases is the first sentence of s 24 of the Constitution, which requires that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth". That phrase had been recognised as one of the central textual sources for the constitutional system of representative government in many earlier cases. 25 That first sentence is directed to the people acting as electors, and has led to members of the Court noting that universal adult suffrage may now be protected, in that any restriction on that general principle has to be justified by the Commonwealth. 26 However, s 24 not only contains the requirement that the members of Parliament be directly chosen by 'the people', but also that '[t]he number of members chosen in the several States shall be in proportion to the respective numbers of their people.' It is 'the people' in that part of s 24 that is affected by s 25 and s 127. As is argued later in this article, Indigenous Australians were excluded from that group by operation of s 127 until 1967, and s 25 accommodates the continuation of that exclusion.
'The People' and proportional representation -the second sentence of s 24
At the heart of the cases referred to above is the principle that 'the Parliament of the Commonwealth will be representative of the people of the Commonwealth.' 27 The precise ways in which such representation is to occur was the subject of debate in the drafting of the Constitution. There were competing visions of national representation, meaning representation of the majority of Australians counted equally, versus representation of the States or peoples of the States, where the States were to be treated equally regardless of population. Most discussion of State representation occurs in relation to the Senate, which is to be "composed of senators for each State directly chosen by the people of the State", 28 293 ____________________________________________________________________________________ number of senators. The House of Representatives can be understood as the House representing the national population, because of the reference to the members being chosen by 'the people of the Commonwealth'. However, it is 'the people', grouped and counted within State boundaries, which affects the composition of that House. 30 It is that aspect of s 24 to which ss 25 and 127 are directed.
Section 24 sets out an arrangement for determining the number of members of the House of Representatives and grants the Parliament the power to change that method. However, any legislation doing so must abide by the 'permanent and absolute provisions of the section', 31 namely the requirement of proportionality between the numbers of people of each State and the number of members chosen in each State.
This requirement of proportionality can be understood as the representation of communities within the overall constitutional community. In drafting this part of the Constitution, the question of 'precisely who or what would be represented in the House was … a contested issue. … The House could represent the Australian people as a whole, the majority of the people as a whole, the people grouped in localities, or the people as individuals.' 32 The text of the second sentence of s 24 reflects the recognition of communities grouped according to State boundaries, within the overall constitutional community, who must receive proportionate representation in the House of Representatives. This is consistent with the understanding at federation of the Commonwealth as 'a community made up of communities'. 33 As argued by Nicholas Aroney, the historical materials concerning the drafting of the Constitution reveal the complexity of the federal union. The Commonwealth was framed as a federation, with the States at its heart. The federal nature of the Commonwealth was consistent with the idea of 'a political community in which there are multiple loci of partly independent and partly interdependent political communities, bound together under a common legal framework'. 34 The constituent entities were the peoples of the States, who were to receive representation as groups through the Parliament, in proportion to population. 35 The struggle to combine popular representation and representation of State communities can be seen throughout the drafting debates, from the 1891 Convention through to the later 1897-98 Convention. In both periods, the concepts were combined through a reference to numerical proportionality of representation within each State, as well as minimum representation of each State. 36 In the later Convention, an additional federal element was imposed -that of the nexus. 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ number of members of the House of Representatives ΄shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of the senators΄. This was to overcome a perceived fear that if the lower House were allowed to grow without limit, it would affect the ΄integrity of΄ the Senate. That is, that the representation of the States in the Senate would be overwhelmed by the representation of the majority of Australians through the House of Representatives. Aroney characterises the final version of the text of s 24 as being 'a balance between local, federal and democratic principles. In this way, section 24 embodied the principle of federalism as much as the principle of national democracy.' 37 The compromise reflected in the wording of the second sentence of s 24 is therefore about representing groups of people, not individuals. That representation need not reflect individual numerical equality. Section 24 requires that each Original State have a minimum of 5 members, regardless of population. Even at federation, this meant that there was significant numerical disparity between the States, due to the differing size of their respective populations. 38 Further, the High Court has rejected any constitutional requirement of absolute numerical equality. In two cases 39 a majority of the High Court rejected the requirement of such equality in either population or electors between electoral divisions within each State, in relation to either the Commonwealth or State Parliaments. 40 However, members of the Court have acknowledged that any legislative choices regarding electoral law must be consistent with the command that members of Parliament be chosen by 'the people' and that gross disproportionality may breach that command. 41 While strict numerical equality between electoral divisions is not required by virtue of s 24, the basic command remains -that the number of members chosen in each State 'shall' be proportionate to the respective number of people of each State. It is that calculation that is affected by ss 127 and 25. Exclusion from 'the people' in that calculation, because of the operation of either s 127 or s 25, signifies exclusion from the represented 'people', organised according to State boundaries. It is not any individual right which is at stake, nor is it the individual exercise of the franchise which is affected. Rather, it is the representative-ness of the Parliament that is the focus of the exclusion discussed in this article. By excluding a category of individuals from the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 37 Aroney, above n 30, 237. 38 See Quick and Garran, above n 14, 455 with respect to Tasmania and Western Australia, and the number of members in relation to the states' populations (excluding 'aborigines') at 459. This exclusion has symbolic force in three ways. First, the mere exclusion itself, which means that individuals are not counted as amongst the constitutional community, understood in this context as the communities within the States. As is developed above, the peoples within the States were the constituent entities in the making of the Constitution, and are at the heart of the federal Commonwealth. Thus, exclusion from this group means exclusion from the core of the constitutional community. The second aspect of the symbolic significance centres on the basis of exclusion. By allowing for racial exclusion, the constitutional community can itself be understood as one whose boundaries may be determined by race. The third aspect concerns representation. As argued by Aroney, the people of the States were to be the ΄beneficiaries΄ of representation in Parliament. 42 Exclusion from that group affects the representation which flows from membership of the group in the sense of no longer being counted as part of the State communities referred to in that part of s 24. In Part II, I explore the exclusion of Indigenous Australians from the constitutional 'people' by operation of s 127, and the subsequent Part addresses how s 25 provides for such exclusion. Advice on s 127 was first given on 29 August 1901, to the effect that 'half-castes' should not be counted as 'aboriginal natives'. 45 That advice was consistent with the way in which 'race' was understood. A person was considered to be of a particular race if they had a 'preponderance' of the relevant blood. 46 That meant a person was an 'aboriginal native' if they were a 'full-blood aboriginal'. They were not 'aboriginal' for the purposes of s 127 if they were a 'half-caste'. 47 This distinction was difficult to apply. The official Commonwealth yearbook, published in 1908, noted that 'half-castes', living in the nomadic state, are practically indistinguishable from aborigines, and up to the present it has not always been found practicable to make the distinction, and no authoritative definition of "'half-caste"' has yet been given.' 48 Further, the application of any such distinction could be affected by the extent of administrative discretion or practical control of relevant officials involved in the implementation of the definition. 49
II THE IMPACT OF SECTION 127
Excluded From What?
The relevant sections Section 127 operated to exclude 'full-blood aborigines', from being counted when 'reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, or of a State, or other part of the Commonwealth.' This had practical significance because the Constitution requires the calculation of 'the people' for a number of purposes, seen in ss 24, 89, 93 and 105. 50 The first section includes a calculation of the number of members of the 'to exclude all full-blooded aboriginals and persons in whom there is a preponderance of aboriginal blood, and to include half-castes and others in whom there is not a preponderance of aboriginal blood.' See also 75 (Opinion 57 of Alfred Deakin). While use of the term 'half-caste' may be confronting and even offensive, it is used here because it was the term adopted at the time and explains how the constitutional term 'aboriginal native' was understood prior to its deletion in 1967. 46 See ibid, vol 1, 626 (Opinion 485 of R R Garran), and vol 2, 637-9 (Opinion 1049 of R R Garran). House of Representatives chosen in each State, as outlined above. That calculation has an effect on the number of members of the House of Representatives to be chosen in each State. It also has symbolic effect by identifying who is to be considered a part of those constitutional communities within the States, represented in Parliament. The last three sections concern financial calculations regarding State debt and Commonwealth surplus. 51 That is, they affect the distribution of finances throughout the Commonwealth, as negotiated at federation. The calculation of the relevant State peoples for these sections had the practical effect of determining how much money each State would receive from the Commonwealth, or have to pay to the Commonwealth. Excluding Indigenous Australians from those calculations signifies exclusion from the community affected by those financial distributions, in the sense of not being considered relevant individuals to be counted. Those financial sections are outlined below, but all of them had practical effect for only a limited period.
Section 89(ii)(b) established that 'Until the imposition of uniform duties of customs … the Commonwealth shall debit to each State … the proportion of the State, according to the number of its people, in the other expenditure of the Commonwealth'. 52 That section operated until 8 October 1901, after which uniform customs duties came into force. 53 Section 93(ii) required that:
During the first five years after the imposition of uniform duties of customs, and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides -… (ii) subject to the last subsection, the Commonwealth shall credit revenue, debit expenditure, and pay balances to the several States as prescribed for the period preceding the imposition of uniform duties of customs.
The 'prescribed' manner in which the calculations were to take place referred back to s 89, and therefore to the reference to the number of the States' people. In 1908, the Commonwealth passed the Surplus Revenue Act 1908 (Cth), which concluded the operation of subsection (ii). 54 _____________________________________________________________________________________ in s 7. The reference to 'the people' in that section is to the people acting as electors. Membership of that group depends on the franchise in effect at the time. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, above n 48, 145, with reference to legislation having been introduced into the House of Representatives with a resolution to protect revenues from that date, 9 October 1901.
54
Section 3 provided that: 'The provision made by section ninety-three of the Constitution in relation to the crediting of revenue, the debiting of expenditure, and the payment of balances to the several States, shall continue until the commencement of this Act and no longer.'
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Section 105 states that 'The Parliament may take over from the States their public debts … or a proportion thereof according to the respective numbers of their people'. 55 In 1929, s 105A was inserted by referendum to provide an alternative method of determining how the Commonwealth could take over State debts. 56 That new section allows for agreements between the Commonwealth and the States regarding those debts. It is not limited by anything in s 105 57 and contains no reference to the number of 'the people' of the States.
The purpose of s 127 as seen in its history
To the extent that the meaning of s 127 can be ascertained from the drafting process and debates, it seems that the section was intended to exclude 'aboriginal natives' from being counted when determining the numbers of 'the people' for particular constitutional calculations. 58 There was little debate regarding this section. The first hint of s 127 appears in additions, by Sir Samuel Griffith, to a proof of the draft Constitution of 1891, which read: 'In reckoning the numbers of the people of a State or Territory aboriginal natives of Australia or of any Island of the Pacific shall not be counted'. 59 That addition was made on the famous voyage on the Lucinda, 60 during which a concentrated period of drafting occurred. However, this clause was removed prior to the draft's presentation to the 1891 Convention. 61 The clause was then reinserted during the course of the 1891 Convention Debates. Griffith introduced it, saying: 62 I intend to propose a new clause, dealing with the mode of reckoning the population. The clause was in the Bill as prepared by the drafting committee, but the general committee struck out the clauses to which it referred. These clauses having been reinserted, it is necessary that this clause also should be reinserted. I move: That the following clause be inserted, to stand clause 3 of chapter VII: -"In reckoning the number of people of a State, or other part of the Commonwealth, the aboriginal natives of Australia shall not be counted." Therefore, it did not appear in the full draft presented to the Convention although it had remained in the earlier forms: Williams, above n 59, 235, 258. 
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The clause was inserted without debate or amendment, and appeared as such in the final draft accepted by the 1891 Convention. 63 The 'clauses to which it referred', that were 'struck out' and then 'reinserted', were most probably the financial clauses discussed above. 64 The commitment to adopting the 1891 draft faltered, with the relevant legislation failing to pass through the colonial Parliaments. 65 After renewed efforts in the Australian colonies, a second Convention was held, which led to the eventual enactment of the Constitution. That later Convention began its work with a draft drawing heavily upon the 1891 draft, despite the stated intention of the new Convention to start afresh. 66 A version of s 127 appeared in the first draft Constitution presented to the 1897 Convention in its first session, in Adelaide. 67 Concern was raised that s 127 affected the right of Indigenous Australians to vote. Dr John Cockburn said 'there are a number of natives who are on the [electoral] rolls [in South Australia], and they ought not to be debarred from voting.' 68 That concern was put to rest when Alfred Deakin explained the section only 'determined the number of your representatives'. Sir Edmund Barton confirmed '[i]t is only for the purpose of determining the quota', being a reference to the calculation in s 24. James Walker added that s 127 affects how 'we come to divide the expenses of the Federal Government per capita' and if 'aboriginals' are left out of that equation, 'South Australia will have so much the less to pay'. 69 This understanding of s 127 as being related to the calculation in s 24 or financial calculations was then confirmed by Barton in the Melbourne session in 1898. He said that s 127 was a reference to 'the reckoning of the number of people … There are various other clauses dealing with finance and other questions, under which it becomes necessary … It relates to determining the number of members. … the provision is merely for statistical purposes. 
Excluding Indigenous Australians from 'The People' 301 ____________________________________________________________________________________ relevant 'numbers' for the constitutional calculations outlined above, 'aboriginal natives' were then excluded from the overall number of people.
The definitions used, and the process for collection of data, regarding population statistics in Australia have not been consistent. 74 The definition regarding Indigenous Australians prior to the 1966 census was that applied above regarding s 127 -those with a 'preponderance of blood'. This can be seen in the questions asked in the census at various times, requiring a quantification of racial descent from the recorded group. 75 It is reflected in the recording of two categories of 'aborigines' in the census -'full blooded' and 'half-caste'. 76 There were changes over time regarding the status of Torres Strait Islanders. Prior to 1947 and in 1966 they were counted as 'aboriginal', with the consequent constitutional exclusion if 'full-blooded'. 77 In 1947 they were counted as Polynesian, and in 1954 and 1961, as Pacific Islanders, all of which meant they were included in the constitutional population count for those periods. 78 Section 127 did not impose a limitation on the census power of the Commonwealth in the sense of prohibiting an enumeration of Indigenous Australians. 79 However, the number of 'full-blooded aborigines' was excluded from the overall figures of the Australian population, within each State and Territory and nationally, in order to satisfy the exclusion mandated by s 127 for the purposes of the constitutional calculations. 80
Significance of section 127
The exclusion of 'aboriginal natives' from the constitutional calculations discussed above had no impact on legal rights or entitlements of those 'aboriginal natives'. Formal legal citizenship, and the right to vote, although complex in their application to Indigenous Australians, were independent of, and unaffected by, s 127. 81 Section 127 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 74 For an overview, see Ross, above n 73. This understanding of the use of the statistics and s 127 was applied from the Conference of Statisticians in 1900: National Library of Australia, above n 64, 14-15, and is seen in the official records of Commonwealth statistics: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, above n 48, 145. 81 See Galligan and Chesterman, above n 44.
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ was also independent of the legal status of Indigenous Australians as subjects of the Queen. Section 127 meant that 'full-blood aborigines' were excluded when determining the number of 'the people' for specific constitutional calculations.
The rationale behind that exclusion was not made clear in the Convention Debates. Barton, in explaining the meaning of the provision in the Melbourne session in 1898, made the enigmatic comments that s 127 is related to determining the 'whole population … where it would not be considered fair to include the aborigines', and that 'it is only considered necessary to leave out of count the aboriginal races' (rather than any other races, as may fall within s 25 discussed below). 82 No further explanation was given, by Barton or anyone else.
While the delegates gave little attention to the exclusion, the exclusion is significant in terms of the status of 'aboriginal natives' as members of 'the people' of the Australian Constitution. The most significant impact can be seen through the exclusion from the calculation in s 24. As is developed above in Part I, the second sentence of s 24 reflects representation according to State communities. The exclusion by s 127 of 'aboriginal natives' reflects an exclusion from the constitutional communities within the States, which must be represented proportionately to their population by members in the Parliament. The symbolic impact of this exclusion is significant, and becomes striking when those excluded by s 127 had a right to vote.
This can be seen in the concern raised by Cockburn in the Convention Debates in 1897. Cockburn was speaking from the perspective of a colony which enfranchised women and Indigenous Australians, in contrast to the majority of the Australian colonies at the time. 83 He received clarification that s 127 would not affect voting rights and stated: 'Even then, as a matter of principle, they ought not to be deducted. … I think that these natives should be preserved as component parts in reckoning up the people.' 84 This reflects the disjunction between the exercise of a vote by some Indigenous Australians, yet their exclusion from being counted as amongst 'the people' represented in the second part of s 24. The same comment was made in the 1959 Report of the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review. That Committee recommended the deletion of s 127 as being an 'injustice to many', 'at this stage of our national development' 85 and '[i]f aborigines are to become qualified as electors then, as a matter of principle, they should be recognized as forming part of the population of the State in which they live.' 86 These comments highlight ideas of membership of the community, seen through the exercise of the vote, as being connected to inclusion amongst the State communities to be represented by Parliament. 
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Excluding Indigenous Australians from 'The People' 303 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Another aspect of the drafting of s 127 provides some insight into how 'aboriginal natives' were considered with respect to membership of the constitutional communities as understood in the second sentence of s 24. That is the comparison between their exclusion and the contemporary inclusion of other groups resident in Australia at the time. In the Melbourne session of the Convention Debates in 1898, the New South Wales and Tasmanian Parliaments proposed extending the exclusion in s 127 to aliens who were not naturalized. 87 The proposal was not directly debated, and was defeated. 88 Thus, aliens were to be included while Indigenous Australians were to be excluded. At federation, Indigenous Australians were formally subjects of the Queen, by virtue of being born within the realm 89 and therefore not aliens. However, they were excluded from a calculation of 'the people' while aliens were to be counted as amongst the relevant population. This is consistent with other historical examples where aliens received greater legal protection and recognition than Indigenous Australians. 90 Section 127 is often described as the section which excluded Indigenous Australians from being counted as citizens. That is incorrect to the extent that 'citizenship' is understood as a formal legal status to which rights attach. However, that idea of exclusion is accurate if citizenship is used in the sense of membership of the constitutional community -a broader notion of being one of the 'people' of the Commonwealth Constitution, represented by Parliament.
III SECTION 25
Section 127 has thus been explained as an exclusionary section, which operated to exclude 'full-blood Aborigines' from being counted as among the constitutional 'people' for particular purposes. Section 127 was deleted in 1967, in the celebrated referendum which also altered s 51(xxvi), the 'races' power. Section 51(xxvi) previously gave the Commonwealth legislative power with respect to 'the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make Chesterman and Galligan, above n 89.
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Federal Law Review Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ special laws'. The exclusion 'other than the aboriginal race in any State' was removed in 1967. The changes to ss 51(xxvi) and 127 received the highest 'yes' vote in any federal constitutional referendum in Australia 91 and the referendum success was heralded as an event of equality, an overturning of historic disadvantage of Indigenous Australians. 92 After that referendum, there was no longer any mention of Indigenous Australians in the text of the Constitution.
The deletion of s 127 led to the removal of the exclusion explored above in Part II. The expected result would therefore be that Indigenous Australians are now considered to be part of the constitutional 'people'. That is certainly the case with respect to the impact on the statistics used for the purpose of constitutional calculations. The Commonwealth census continued to ask a question about race, but the results no longer led to constitutional exclusion of Indigenous Australians. The changes in 1967 have been described as resulting in a neutral citizenship for Indigenous Australians. 93 Explicit exclusion was removed, so the constitutional position of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians was relevantly the same.
However, the existence of s 25 in the Constitution means that there is neither pure equality nor neutrality. Indigenous Australians, as well as other groups defined as 'races', 94 
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Excluding Indigenous Australians from 'The People' 305 ____________________________________________________________________________________ requires that if a State disqualifies people from voting on the basis of race, all persons of that race resident in the State must be excluded from being counted as among the 'people of the State' for the s 24 calculation. That is, the exclusion of Indigenous Australians that was mandated by s 127, but overcome in 1967, is countenanced by s 25. If a State legislated in a relevant manner, the practical legal effect of s 127 would be reinstated. Further, the symbolic element of exclusion continues by the maintenance of a section which allows for such exclusion to occur.
It is unlikely today that a State would enact relevantly discriminatory legislation. While it can be argued that legislation may operate with disproportionate effect on particular groups, or fail to address indirect discrimination, a law which directly disenfranchises individuals simply on the basis of race is beyond what I believe would be politically acceptable in any Australian State today. Nevertheless, the constitutional text in s 25 indicates such legislation is permissible. Even if such legislation is never enacted in the future, the symbolic implications of that constitutional text justify a detailed consideration of s 25. The symbolic effect of allowing exclusion on the basis of race, with consequential restriction on representation by the Parliament, remains of concern despite the absence of State legislation enacting such exclusion.
Section 25 Prior to 1967
Most of the Convention Debates regarding s 25 assume that the section was directed towards alien races. 95 However, the possibility that s 25 might apply to Indigenous Australians was mentioned. Sir Joseph Carruthers, in addressing a possible ambiguity in the wording of the section, stated: 'What was intended was to exclude from the 1897-98 Convention Debates, 13 September 1897, 453. The meaning of 'aboriginal' has changed over time. In the colonial era, it was used to refer to the original inhabitants of a place, while 'native' was used to refer to someone born in Australia -usually a reference to white Australians of British heritage: Chesterman and Galligan, above n 89, 87 and see Irving, above n 94, ch 7. In the context of the debate on s 25, and given the wording of the colonial franchise legislation, it is likely that Carruthers was referring to Indigenous Australians. It is of note that the interaction between ss 25 and 127 does not seem to have been considered by the delegates.
97
Queensland was the last State to remove its racially discriminatory franchise legislation. For details regarding the franchise in place at various times, see Goot, above n 86.
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ that s 25 had no effect with respect to Indigenous Australians. This is significant when considering what could be characterised as the benevolent underlying purpose of s 25.
Section 25 imposes a numerical disadvantage on a State if the State discriminates against a race with respect to the State franchise. The State cannot count the people of that race for the purpose of determining the number of members of the House of Representatives to be chosen in that State. Therefore, the State may have fewer members chosen in that State if the number of people discriminated against is significant enough to affect the calculation set out in s 24. Section 25 can thus be understood as a disincentive against discrimination. However, a careful analysis of ss 25 and 127 demonstrates that this potential disincentive did not apply with respect to Indigenous Australians prior to 1967.
The view that s 25 had a purpose of reducing racial discrimination comes from the American inspiration for the text. Quick and Garran begin their discussion of s 25 with a reference to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. That Amendment states: 98 When the right to vote at any election … is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States … the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Quick and Garran explained: 99
That amendment was passed after the Civil War, in order to induce the Governments of the States to confer the franchise on the emancipated negroes, who were declared citizens of the United States. It was designed to penalize, by a reduction of their federal representation, those States which refused to enfranchise the negroes.
In the Convention Debates regarding s 25, only indirect mention is made of the connection between the section and the American text. Cockburn sought to extend s 25 to exclude anyone disenfranchised, regardless of race. In response, Griffith noted the similarity between that proposal (which was defeated) and the American text, in the context of recommending against Cockburn's amendment. 100 Despite the lack of exact equivalence, the effect of s 25 is the same as for the American clause -to act as a disincentive to disenfranchisement.
Despite this beneficial purpose of s 25, it did not operate with respect to Indigenous Australians. The overlap with respect to s 127 prior to 1967 meant that s 25 could not operate as a disincentive to discrimination against Indigenous Australians. As is explained above, s 127 had the effect of excluding all 'full-blooded aboriginal' people from being counted as amongst the relevant people of the States for the purpose of s 24. That was so regardless of whether or not the States enfranchised that group. That is, no State could count 'aboriginal natives' as amongst their 'people' for the purpose of determining the number of members of Parliament to be chosen in their State because s 127 excluded all of those people.
Further, the definition of 'aboriginal native' and 'race' adopted prior to 1967 meant that if discrimination occurred against persons who were considered 'half-caste In 1921, Robert Garran, as Solicitor-General, was asked for advice regarding which groups should be excluded from the calculation in s 24. He confirmed that all 'aboriginal natives' were excluded by s 127. Garran adopted the 'preponderance of blood' idea of race. He stated that '[p]ersons of the half-blood cannot, I think be regarded as persons of any race and should, therefore, in my opinion be counted [in the calculation under s 24].' 102 Those who fell within the notion of 'persons of the halfblood' were therefore counted as amongst the relevant people in Western Australia, giving that State the numerical benefit of their inclusion for the purpose of the calculation in s 24. At the same time, Western Australia could deny those people the vote in their State without any disadvantageous effect by virtue of s 25, as those people were not considered to be of a 'race' for the purpose of that section.
Thus, the beneficial purpose of s 25, to act as a disincentive to discrimination, did not apply with respect to Indigenous Australians prior to 1967, whether classified as 'full-blood' or 'half-caste' according to the definitions applied at the time. Section 25, can therefore only be considered as a section having a negative connotation with respect to the status of Indigenous Australians.
The section assumes that racial discrimination may occur and implicitly allows it to continue. This allowance of racial discrimination is particularly significant given the constitutional importance of the State franchise. The interim constitutional franchise prior to Commonwealth legislation was that which applied for the lower House of the Parliament in each State. 103 Therefore, s 25 implicitly allowed for the interim federal franchise to be racially discriminatory. 104 It did so by contemplating that such discrimination might occur, and which as is shown above, did not necessarily have a disadvantageous numerical impact with respect to all racial discrimination. This acceptance of racial discrimination should not be surprising for any reader of the Convention Debates or early federal Parliamentary Debates. The question of race at the time was clearly based on a distinction between 'desirable' and 'undesirable' races. 105
The paradox of s 25 after 1967
The significance of s 25 prior to 1967, with respect to Indigenous Australians, is indirect. It had no effect with respect to Indigenous Australians' exclusion from State _____________________________________________________________________________________ 101 Electoral Act 1907 (WA), s 18(d). 102 Brazil and Mitchell (eds), above n 45, Vol 2, 637-9, Opinion 1049. 103 See ss 30, 8 of the Constitution. 104 The initial uniform federal franchise established in 1902 was also racially discriminatory, disenfranchising all Indigenous Australians unless they already had the right to vote at the state level: see Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth), s 4. This allowed the continuation of discrimination at the federal level which did not attract any constitutional disadvantage compared to the equivalent discrimination at the state level. 105 See for example George Williams , above n 94; Irving, above n 94, ch 6.
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ franchises on the basis of race, as any 'full-blood aboriginal' was already excluded under s 127, and anyone of the 'half-blood' was not counted as of any race at all. However, the implicit allowance for racial discrimination, with a flow-on effect at least initially for the federal vote, gives some guidance regarding the constitutional status of Indigenous Australians.
This part of this article addresses the significance and effect of s 25 after 1967. When s 127 was deleted in 1967, the overlap in operation of that section with s 25 was removed. This part explains the ongoing role of s 25 in relation to Indigenous Australians and exclusion from 'the people' in the calculation in s 24. Paradoxically, post-1967, s 25 has a broader effect of exclusion than s 127 previously had. This is due to the adoption by government of a different approach to defining who is an Indigenous Australian.
The significance of possible exclusion by s 25 from the calculation in s 24 is that discussed above in Part I, and considered in Part II with respect to the operation of s 127. As Griffith stated in the Convention Debates, in introducing the draft Constitution to the 1891 Convention, the section which was to become s 25 provided that 'in any state where there is a race of people not admitted to a share in the representation there, it shall not be counted in reckoning the number of members to be elected to the parliament of the commonwealth.' 106 Griffith was drawing attention to the notion of representation through exercising the vote, that is, acting as an elector. In turn, being excluded from that aspect of representation leads to exclusion from another, being part of 'the people' represented by Parliament, as identified in the second sentence of s 24. As is developed above, any potential exclusion of Indigenous Australians under s 25 was overridden by the effect of s 127. However, with that section's removal in 1967, the application of s 25 with respect to Indigenous Australians was revived. 107 The text of s 25 was unchanged by the 1967 referendum, despite a proposal being put to the electors at the time which, if successful, would have led to its deletion. In addition to the celebrated referendum question, which led to the deletion of s 127 and the amendment of s 51(xxvi), was a lesser known question concerned with the nexus between the number of members of the House of Representatives and the number of senators. The Bill underlying the nexus proposal included the deletion of s 25, but that section was not mentioned in the referendum question itself or in the Yes and No cases regarding the proposal. 108 The referendum on the nexus proposal failed. 109 
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ with respect to the new definition. Nevertheless, statements of several individual justices have supported the combination of descent, self-identity and community recognition in determining the meaning of 'Indigenous Australian' or the 'aboriginal race'. 115 Other changes have occurred since 1967, that alter the context in which s 25 operates. The idea of race has been challenged by being put in doubt as a valid or useful means of distinguishing between individuals and groups. 116 Attitudes to discrimination, as seen within legislation, have also changed. Rather than explicit discrimination against groups on the basis of race featuring in State, Territory and federal legislation, in 1975 the Commonwealth Parliament enacted legislation prohibiting such discrimination. 117 The States and Territories followed suit. 118 Section 25 remains in the Constitution despite these changed circumstances. It is likely that it would be considered in a different manner today compared to its application prior to 1967. The acceptance of a new, more nuanced definition of Indigenous Australians, affects the application of s 25 to that group. Rather than s 25 only applying to discrimination which restricts the ability of 'full-blood aborigines' to vote, legislation which applies to Indigenous Australians as understood under the broader definition would be caught by that section. Thus, paradoxically, by being more inclusive regarding who is an Indigenous Australian, and having a different approach to notions of 'race', s 25 would have a broader application than previously.
While some of the underlying concepts may have changed in application, the basic consequence of s 25 remains the same. Exclusion from the State franchise on the basis of race leads to exclusion from being counted as amongst the 'people' referred to in the second sentence of s 24. Section 25 remains in the Constitution with the possible application to Indigenous Australians. Even if relevant State legislation is not introduced, s 25 still signifies that exclusion on the basis of race from 'the people' in the s 24 calculation is constitutionally permissible.
It might be thought that s 25 is a dead-letter, a section which can have no legal effect. All States had removed racial discrimination from their franchise laws by the end of 1965. However, State legislatures can reinstate such discrimination, even if it is politically unlikely at present. One argument against that possibility is that the Excluding Indigenous Australians from 'The People' 311 ____________________________________________________________________________________ combined operation of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ('RDA') and s 109 of the Constitution would prevent the operation of any such legislation. The RDA prohibits discrimination on the basis of race with respect to, amongst other things, elections. 119 Section 109 of the Constitution provides that: 'When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the later shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.' Thus, any reintroduction of racial discrimination with respect to the State franchise would be invalid. 120 There are three problems with the argument that the RDA prevents s 25 from having any effect. The first problem is that the RDA may be amended, or discriminatory measures may be exempt from the general prohibition of discrimination if they constitute 'special measures' 121 or if a federal Act explicitly excludes the operation of the RDA. One controversial example of avoiding the RDA was the legislation to implement the 'Northern Territory Intervention' in 2007. 122 There are also two plausible constitutional arguments that neither the RDA, nor any other federal legislation, can in any event restrict a State's choice of its franchise. 123 The High Court has accepted that there is an implied limitation to federal legislative power in that the Commonwealth cannot destroy a State or a State's ability to function as a government. 124 In the most recent cases concerning this principle, the Court has struck down legislation because it impaired the ability of a State to determine the entitlements of senior members of its judiciary or legislature. 125 A similar argument could be made
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ that the autonomy of a State is impermissibly impaired by federal legislation restricting the State's choice of electoral system. Therefore, the RDA may not prevent racial discrimination in relation to the franchise of a State. Alternatively, or in addition, s 25 could be read as permissive, in the sense that it gives the States the ability to discriminate on the basis of race, albeit with a consequential numerical disadvantage. 126 If s 25 is read in this light, then it is plausible that Commonwealth legislative power is limited to the extent that it could not interfere with the permission given to the States by the text of the Constitution.
Two constitutional arguments could be made against the possibility of s 25 applying with respect to Indigenous Australians today, although neither appears particularly strong. One is to consider whether the federal protection of a universal adult franchise could be extended to the State franchise. The decisions of Roach and Rowe have strengthened earlier statements of the Court that it would be difficult to justify gender or race discrimination with respect to the federal vote. In these recent cases, a majority of the Court relied on the phrase 'chosen by the people' to imply limits on the Federal Parliament's ability to restrict the federal franchise. 127 The Australian Constitution does not impose such an explicit requirement of 'choice by the people' onto State legislatures. 128 Extensions of federal constitutional limitations to State Parliaments are possible, as seen in relation to the implied freedom of political communication 129 and Chapter III concerns. 130 However, in those instances it is because federal issues are at stakeeither discussion regarding federal political issues, or impacts upon federal judicial power. It is unlikely that the internal electoral arrangements of a State would have the
